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Abstract:  Knowledge spillover implies that the social value of knowledge 
is higher than its private value and leads to insufficient private investment in 
human capital.  This paper examines implications for economic growth and 
offers a remedy.  An incentive mechanism that implements the socially 
optimal outcome is offered based on a learning subsidy and flat income or 
consumption taxes (each levied at a different phase of the growth process).  
The scheme is self-financed in that the tax proceeds cover exactly the 
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1.  Introduction 
  Knowledge spillovers lead to market failure in human capital investment.  
This paper investigates possible consequences of this market failure for knowledge-
based economic growth and offers a remedy.  We find that knowledge spillovers can 
lead to substantial differences in growth patterns under private and social learning 
regimes.  Aiming at a mechanism that implements the socially optimal outcome, we 
design a simple incentive scheme consisting of flat learning subsidy and taxes.  The 
scheme is self-financed, in that the tax proceeds cover exactly the subsidy payments at 
each instant of time, so that no lump sum transfers are needed.   
  The literature on knowledge-based economic growth can be traced back to 
Arrow's (1962) learning-by-doing model and Shell's (1966, 1967, 1973) treatment of 
knowledge assets as an additional sector subject to policy decisions – both were early 
attempts to endogenize Solow's (1956, 1957) technical change process.  The recent 
literature follows Lucas (1988) who assumed that knowledge accumulation (learning) 
is a time-consuming activity and incorporated external (spillover) effects (see Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin 2004, Chapter 5).  Here we adopt Shell's approach, which treats 
learning as an income-consuming activity, and incorporate external knowledge 
effects.  Our formulation enables a complete dynamic characterization of the 
endogenous growth processes and facilitates the design of an optimal learning 
mechanism.   
The dynamic characterization is based on a necessary condition for sustained 
growth expressed in terms of the marginal productivity of human and physical capital.  
An economy that satisfies the growth condition needs also sufficient capital-
knowledge endowment to realize its growth potential.  The optimal growth processes 
exhibit a turnpike property (Samuelson 1965, Cass 1966), in that they reach a certain   2
path (the turnpike) as rapidly as possible (in a sense precisely defined in the text) and 
proceed along it thereafter. Other growth models that behave in this fashion are 
discussed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (op cit.); Tsur and Zemel (2002) found a similar 
growth pattern in a model of growth under resource scarcity.  
The proposed incentive scheme consists of a learning subsidy and income or 
consumption taxes to finance the subsidy expense without distorting household 
decisions.  The learning subsidy is applied at a constant rate along the turnpike and 
may be implemented also during the transitional phase (the most-rapid-approach to 
the turnpike) if capital endowment is large enough.  The flat income tax (levied at the 
same rate for both capital and labor income) is used temporarily during the 
transitional phase to cover the subsidy payments.  Once the turnpike has been 
reached, the distorting nature of income tax rules out its further use and a flat 
consumption tax is used instead to finance the subsidy.  An attractive feature of this 
mechanism is that its budget is balanced at each instant of time without a resort to 
lump sum transfers. 
  Similar properties have been obtained by Rebelo (1991) who studied tax 
policies in an extended Lucas framework without external effects and identified the 
conditions under which consumption or income taxes are neutral to growth.  
Empirical evidence on the growth effects of taxes seems to depend on the formulation 
and calibration of the specific model considered, as, e.g., in Lucas 1990, Jones et al. 
1993, 1997, Pecorino 1994, Stokey and Rebelo 1995, Glomm and Ravikumar 1998, 
and Judd 1999.  These works study a broad set of issues relating to short- and long-
run growth effects of fiscal policy under various political and public spending 
restrictions, but pay little attention to the external effects of knowledge.  Yet, there is 
ample evidence to suggest the existence of substantial social benefits to education that   3
are not privately captured (Haveman and Wolfe 1984, Acemoglu 1996, Lochner and 
Moretti 2001, Wolfe and Haveman 2002).  In this work we focus on these social 
effects, and providing private learning incentives that account for them is the primary 
purpose of our mechanism. 
  The paper proceeds as follows:  The economic environment – the underlying 
market conditions and decisions made by firms and households – is presented in 
Section 2; although fairly standard by now, this section lays down the model 
equations for the analysis that follows and serves to highlight the external effects of 
human capital and the difference between private and social processes.  A complete 
dynamic characterization of the optimal private and social growth processes is given 
in Section 3.  These processes are compared in Section 4 to evaluate the inefficiency 
associated with private learning under Cobb-Douglas production technology and iso-
elastic consumption preferences.  Section 5 describes the learning policy and shows 
how it achieves the socially optimal outcome.  Section 6 concludes and the 
appendices contain technical derivations.   
2.  The economy  
  The economy consists of a large number of identical households and a large 
number of identical firms.  Households own labor, human capital (knowledge) and 
asset capital (saving).  Firms hire these factors to produce a composite good, 
operating in a competitive environment to maximize profit at each point of time while 
taking the factor prices as given.  Identical rational firms facing the same market 
conditions will make the same production decisions.  A similar remark holds for the 
households, which determine the accumulation of human and asset capital in order to 
maximize the present value of a stream of consumption utilities subject to budget 
constraints.  In equilibrium, the factor prices clear the spot labor and capital markets   4
at each point of time.  To focus attention on endogenous growth, population is 
assumed constant and exogenous technical change is assumed away.  The 
considerations governing the behavior of all agents are now summarized. 
Firms:  Firm i employs Ki units of physical capital and Li workers to produce 
the output Yi = F(Ki,A(h)Li)B(H), where h represents individual (intrafirm) worker's 
level of human capital, A(h) is a labor-augmenting productivity function, B(H) is an 
inter-firm technology index that depends on aggregate knowledge H = Lh, and L = 
ΣiLi is aggregate labor.  The productivity index B represents the state of technology 
adopted by the economy up to the present time and incorporates the external effects of 
knowledge (Lucas, 1988).  It is specified as output augmenting but could enter as 
labor augmenting (as, for example, in Bils and Klenow 2000) without changing the 
nature of the results.   
The production function F is assumed to be linearly homogenous, thus can be 
expressed as F(Ki,A(h)Li) = Li A(h) f(ki/A(h)), where ki = Ki/Li is firm i's capital per 
worker and f is assumed increasing and strictly concave over (0,∞) with f(0) = 0, 
f(∞) = ∞,  f '(0) = ∞ and f ′(∞) = 0.   
  At each point of time, firms observe the aggregate stock of human capital, the 
wage rate w and the capital rental rate r and demand the capital per worker that 
maximizes profit per worker A(h) f(ki/A(h))B(H) – rki – w, obtaining the first order 
condition 
f ′(ki/A(h))B(H) = r.  (2.1)
The labor market clearing wage rate w coresponds to a vanishing profit, yielding, in 
view of (2.1),   
[A(h)f(ki/A(h)) − kif ′(ki/A(h))]B(H) = w.  (2.2)  5
Multiplying (2.1) by Ki and (2.2) by Li, adding the results and summing over all firms 
gives   
rK + wL = LA(h)f(k/A(h))B(H) = Y,  
where Y = ΣiYi is aggregate output.  Dividing through by L, we find  
rk + w = A(h)f(k/A(h))B(H) ≡ y(k,h,H).   (2.3)
Equation (2.3) relates household income (on the left-hand side) to the current levels of 
physical and human capital.  
Households:  Households decide on the evolution of their asset holdings 
(saving), human capital and consumption.  With identical households, no lending-
borrowing takes place and households' assets coincide with the capital available to the 
firms.  Following Shell (1966, 1967, 1973), we assume that learning is an income-
consuming activity so that knowledge accumulation is proportional to learning 
outlays.  Households, then, allocate income between consumption (c), saving (  = 
investment in physical capital) and learning (  = investment in human capital).  In 
view of (2.3), the representative household budget constraint is    
At each point of time, the household decides on the fraction αt of income devoted to 




c k H h k y + = & ) , , (.
) , , ( t t t t t H h k y h α = & .   (2.4)
The remaining income is allocated between consumption and saving, so that 
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Depreciation of both types of capital is ignored for convenience.  Implicit in (2.5) is 
the assumption that investment in physical capital is reversible (i.e., consumption can 
derive from the stock of capital at no extra cost).    6
The representative household derives utility from consumption according to an 
increasing and concave utility function u(c).  Time preferences are represented by the 
positive utility discount rate ρ.  A plan is a continuum of consumption-investment 
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A feasible plan satisfies (2.4), (2.5), ht ≥ 0, kt ≥ 0, ct ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1 for all 
t ≥ 0, given capital-knowledge endowment k0 and h0.  (The upper bound on αt entails 
investing all income in learning.  Alternative exogenous bounds can be assumed at no 
extra complication.)  The optimal plan is the feasible plan that maximizes (2.6).  We 
denote by V(k0,h0) the value of (2.6) under the optimal plan.   
In solving the optimization problem, the household treats aggregate 
knowledge H as exogenously given when evaluating the marginal effects of changes 
in his own knowledge level h, even though it is recognized that in equilibrium 
Ht = Lht.  A social planner, on the other hand, would account for these spillover 
effects of knowledge.  The household, in fact, could be made better off by doing the 
same.  Nonetheless, if everyone else accounts for the external effects of learning, an 
individual household can improve his position by ignoring the contribution of his own 
learning to the aggregate knowledge stock, which excludes the socially optimal policy 
from the set of Nash equilibrium policies.  We shall refer to a plan that ignores the 
external effects of knowledge as private; a plan that that accounts for these effects is 
called social.  In the following section we characterize the optimal private and social 
plans.  The extent of inefficiency of the former is analyzed in Section 4 and Section 5 
offers a self-financed learning mechanism that implements the socially optimal 
outcome.     7
3.  Dynamic characterization of the optimal private and social processes 
The extent of learning at each point of time depends on α – the part of income 
devoted to support learning activities.  Since the dynamic equations (2.4)-(2.5) are 
linear in α and the objective (2.6) is independent of α, the optimal learning policy at 
each point of time takes one of three distinct regimes: no learning (α = 0), maximal 
learning (α = 1), or singular learning (defined below).  Under each regime, 
consumption and saving are optimally adjusted to the chosen learning regime.  This 
classification allows describing the optimal (h,k) process in terms of two characteristic 
lines defined in the state space. 
The first line is defined by the locus of (h,k) states at which the marginal 
productivity of human capital, yh ≡ ∂y(k,h,H)/∂h, equals that of physical capital, 
yk ≡ ∂y/∂k, implying that no additional gains can be made by reshuffling investment 
between k and h when they both increase.  This line differs between the private and 
social plans because the marginal productivity of h (yh) depends on whether H is taken 
as an exogenous parameter (private) or as H =Lh (social).  Let ηA(h) = A′(h)h/A(h) and 
ηB(H) = B′(H)H/B(H) denote the elasticities of internal and external knowledge 
effects, respectively, x = k/A(h) and z(x) ≡ f(x)/f ′(x) – x.  The marginal productivity of 
human capital is obtained from (2.3): 
(p)      ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( H B h A' x z x f' yh =
(so) ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( [ H B h A' h / H η x f x z x f' y A B h η + =  
(3.1)
where "p" stands for "private" and "so" for "socially optimal".  Recalling (2.3), we 

























 Notice,  recalling  f
 ′(x)> 0 and f
 ′′(x)<0, that z(x) is increasing.  Solving for the 
variable x = k/A(h), we see that (3.2p) defines a line in the h-k plane, which we call 
the private singular line and denote by  .  The analogous solution of (3.2so) also 
defines a line in the h-k plane, called the social singular line and denoted  .  We 
use the notation k  to represent either   or   when no confusion arises.  
It turns out that   is the unique locus of (h,k) points along which the singular 
learning policy is supported (see claim 3 of Appendix A).  This property explains the 
name singular attached to this line.  The second term of (3.2so), representing the 
contribution of the external effects, is positive.  Since z(x) is increasing, this term 
implies that  .  This difference between the two singular lines turns out 
























To understand the economic significance of the singular line note that above the 
line, when k > k
S(h), the relation yk < yh holds, so that capital is less productive than 
knowledge hence investment in human capital is more attractive than saving (see 
Claim 7 in Appendix A).  The opposite situation holds below the singular line.  Along 
the singular line the two forms of capital are equally productive at the margin and we 
expect the decision maker (household for the private plan and the social planner for 
the social plan) to be indifferent between investing in one or the other.  Indeed, we 
find that if the economy grows indefinitely, the optimal (h,k) process first approaches 
the singular line at a most-rapid-learning rate: maximal learning (α = 1) above the line   9
and no learning (α = 0) below it.  Once the singular line has been reached, singular 
learning (with 0 < α < 1) is adopted, adjusting the optimal process to evolve along the 
singular line.  As this behavior is akin to turnpike models of growth (Samuelson 1965, 
Cass, 1966), we refer to the singular line also as the turnpike.   
The second characteristic line in the (h,k) plane is defined by equating the 
marginal productivity of capital yk with the utility discount rate ρ.  Using (2.3), this 
condition becomes 
f '(k/A(h))B(H) = ρ.  (3.3)
Solving for k, we find 
k(h) = A(h)
 f '
 −1(ρ/B(Lh)).  (3.4)
The properties of A, f and B ensure that k(h) is increasing.  The function k(h) 
represents the optimal steady state of k when no learning takes place and human 
capital is fixed.  We thus refer to k(h) as the steady-state line.  Indeed, if the private or 
social knowledge-capital process ever approaches a finite steady state (when learning 
is allowed), the steady state must fall on this line (Claim 1 in Appendix A).  Notice, 
from (3.3) and (2.1), that r = ρ along the steady state line; this equality must hold at 
any finite steady state. 
We can now state the following property:  
Property 3.1:  (i) The optimal knowledge and capital processes must either converge 
to a steady state on the steady-state line or grow indefinitely along the singular line.  
(ii) For a growing economy, the optimal (h,k) processes approach the singular line at a 
most-rapid-learning rate, i.e., no learning (α = 0) below the line and maximal 
learning (α = 1) above it, and evolve along it thereafter.      10
The property holds for both the private and social plans by considering the 
private and social singular lines, respectively.  Part (ii) of the property establishes the 
singular line as the turnpike for growing economies.  The final (singular) phase 
follows from Part (i).  The initial (most-rapid-approach) phase is understood recalling 
that only the extreme learning regimes (α = 0 or α = 1) are allowed away from the 
singular line.  To determine the particular learning regime recall that below the 
singular line physical capital is more productive at the margin than human capital 
(yk > yh) while the reverse relation holds above it.  The proof is given in Appendix A. 
What are the conditions under which economies grow?  As it turns out, these 
conditions depend on the relative location of the two characteristic lines at large 
knowledge levels.  Two cases are considered, classifying economies into one of two 
possible types:   
(i)  The singular line lies above the steady-state line at large h, i.e., 
limh→∞ [k
S(h) − k(h)] > 0. 
(ii)  The singular line does not exceed the steady-state line at large h, i.e., 
limh→∞ [k
S(h) − k(h)] ≤ 0.  
Economies that satisfy condition (i) are referred to as converging economies and those 
satisfying condition (ii) are called potentially growing economies.  Economies of the 
first type eventually stagnate at a finite steady state, whereas those of the second type 
have the capacity to grow indefinitely pending "appropriate" capital-knowledge 
endowment.  The type classification depends on the production functions and on the 
utility discount rate ρ but not on the instantaneous utility u(c), which does not enter 
the definitions of k
S(h) or k(h).  Notice that because the singular line takes on different 
forms under the private and social plans, the same economy can be of a different type 
under each of these plans.  With the social singular line lying below its private   11
counterpart, an economy that is potentially growing under the private plan maintains 
its type under the social plan.  However, a private converging economy can obtain 
either type under the social plan.  Explicit examples of these situations are considered 
in the next section.   
 The  large-h relations that define the two types of economy either extend all the 
way down to the initial knowledge state (if the characteristic lines never cross), or are 
reversed at some point (if the lines cross).  We consider here only situations where the 
two lines cross at most once.  Multiple crossing introduces some ambiguity regarding 
the identification of the optimal steady states, but otherwise yields no further insight 
and is therefore ignored (see Tsur and Zemel, 2001, for a discussion of multiple 
equilibria in a related context.)  Denoting the intersection point by  , we see that 
the singular line of a converging economy is above the steady-state line for all   
(or for all h if the lines never cross above h0).  For potentially growing economies, the 
geometrical relation is reversed. 
) ˆ , ˆ ( k h
h h ˆ >
To understand the significance of the relative location of the two lines, we 
refer to the property that consumption typically decreases above the steady-state line 
(except under maximal learning where α = 1 – see Claim 2).  If the optimal (h,k) 
process of a converging economy were to grow along the singular line from some 
time onward, it would eventually enter the domain where the singular line lies above 
the steady-state line and from that time the consumption process would have to 
decrease indefinitely.  But such a policy cannot be optimal, since entering a steady 
state at any point along such a decreasing consumption path is feasible and yields a 
higher welfare.  This explains the name "converging" attached to this type of 
economies.   12
While yh = yk holds along the singular line, yh > yk holds above it (Claim 4, 
Appendix A).  Thus, it cannot be optimal for a potentially growing economy to settle 
at a steady state above the singular line, since yh > yk implies that the economy would 
be better off converting some of its physical capital to knowledge (Claim 6).  If the 
knowledge-capital endowment suffices to raise the knowledge stock of a potentially 
growing economy above   (that is, to the domain where the steady-state line lies 
above the singular line), then the process cannot converge, since the steady state 
would have to be located above the singular line.  The only possibility left for this 
economy is to grow along the turnpike, explaining the name "potentially growing" 
attached to this type of economies.  Observe that these considerations do not rule out 
steady states with   below the singular line.  Indeed, potentially growing 
economies may not realize their growth potential if their capital-knowledge 
endowment is too small.  
h ˆ
h h ˆ <
Consider a converging economy endowed with a knowledge stock   so 
that the geometry of Figure 1 is obtained.  Possible state-space evolution paths for this 
economy corresponding to different capital endowments k0 are depicted in the figure.  




Excluding cases with exceedingly high capital endowment (above k
1(h0) of 
Figure 1), the optimal policy of a converging economy is a most-rapid-learning-
approach to the singular line (αt = 0 below the singular line and αt = 1 above it), 
followed by a ride along the singular line to a steady state at the intersection point 
.  When k0 = k
1(h0), the maximal learning policy (αt = 1) drives the (h,k) process 
directly to  .  When k0 > k
1, the optimal plan begins with αt = 1, steering the (h,k) 
) ˆ , ˆ ( k h
) ˆ , ˆ ( k h  13
process above the intersection point (  and switching to the no learning policy 
(αt = 0) at some point before reaching the singular line.  From that time onward, the 
processes converge to a steady state on the steady-state line right below the switching 
point.  In all cases this economy encourages some learning, increasing knowledge to 
 or higher.  The equilibrium capital stock is also increased relative to the level k(h0) 
that would have been obtained without the option to learn and accumulate knowledge.   
) ˆ , ˆ k h
h ˆ
Time trajectories of learning, knowledge and capital processes are shown in 
Figures 2-3 for the cases k0 < k
S(h0) and k
1(h0) > k0 > k
S(h0).  Notice that learning may 
not be initiated at the outset: with small endowment, learning is delayed to allow 
capital build up until the turnpike is reached (at k
S(h0)), at which time learning begins 
and tuned so as to steer the (ht,kt) process along the turnpike (Figure 2).  In contrast, 
larger endowments call for maximal learning (αt = 1) immediately (Figure 3).  Notice 
also that the most-rapid-learning-approach to the singular line can give rise to a non-
monotonic evolution of the capital process kt (Figure 3).  
Figures 2-3 
Possible state-space evolution paths for potentially growing economies with 
different endowments are depicted in Figures 4-5, with the arrows, again, indicating 
the directions in which the processes evolve.  The endowment is related, for each 
path, to some threshold capital stocks defined in Appendix A.  
Figures 4-5 
Potentially growing economies blessed with sufficient endowments reach the 
turnpike at a most rapid learning approach and grow along it thereafter.  Poorer 
economies, however, ignore the learning option altogether and converge to a poverty 
trap at k(h0).  In some intermediate cases (depicted as the middle trajectory of Figure 
4), learning is worthwhile for some period, but being too poor to carry these activities   14
all the way to the turnpike, the household terminates learning at some point above the 
turnpike and converges to the steady state on the steady state line below.  The 
complete characterization of the various trajectories is given in Appendix A. 
Notice that the human and physical capital endowments are substitutes to 
some extent.  For example, if   the characteristic lines do not cross in the 
relevant domain.  A potentially growing economy, then, will grow indefinitely with 
any positive capital endowment.  Similarly, a sufficiently large initial capital stock 
calls for some learning that may be temporary (if the economy eventually settles at a 
steady state) or permanent (if it grows).   
h h ˆ
0 >
4.  Consequences of knowledge spillover 
  We study the effects of knowledge spillover by comparing the private and 
social plans for an economy characterized by:   
f(x) = θ x
β,  0 < β < 1 (Cobb-Douglas); 
A(h) = h
a,  0 < a < 1; 
B(H) = (H/L)




and the iso-elastic utility   
u(c) = (c
1−σ−1)/(1−σ), σ > 1.  (4.1d)
Under (4.1b-c), the elasticities ηA(h) = A′(h)h/A(h) and ηB(H) = B′(H)H/B(H) reduce 
to the constants a and b, respectively.  It will prove useful to introduce the notation 
η = β/(1−β) and   
β β β β θ ϕ
− − =
1 ) 1 (.
Specification (4.1) corresponds to an economy that faces a menu of technologies 
(developed elsewhere) from which to adopt.  Due to setup cost, know-how spillovers 
and other external effects associated with technology adoption, the technology index 
B depends on aggregate knowledge (Lucas 1988, Bils and Klenow 2000).  The   15
parameter θ  represents social infrastructure, such as corruption level, quality of 
institutions and property right enforcement (Hall and Jones 1999, De Soto 2000, 
Easterly 2001, Parente and Prescott 2002).   
Under the above specification, the singular lines (equations (3.2)) and the 
steady-state line (equation (3.4)) specialize to  
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Recalling the type classification of Section 3, we see that a + b/(1−β) < 1 implies a 
converging type under both the private and social plans and rules out sustained 
growth.  We thus assume a + b/(1−β) ≥ 1 and focus on the threshold case  
a + b/(1−β) = 1.  (4.4)
Under (4.4), the steady-state line (4.3) reduces to the straight line 
h h k
) 1 /( 1 ) / ( ) (
β ρ βθ
− = .  (4.5)
Since the singular and steady state lines are straight lines emanating from the origin, 
they cannot intersect at positive h values.  The analysis of Section 3, then, implies that 
the economy is converging when the singular line lies above the steady-state line and 
is potentially growing when  
(p)     ϕ ρ
β − <
1 a
(so)  ρ < ϕ  
(4.6)
It is verified that under (4.1) the right-hand side of (4.6) equals the marginal 
productivity of capital (∂y/∂k) along the singular line (4.2), which, according to (2.1), 
determines the interest rate:   16
(p)  rp = a
1−βϕ 
(so)  rso = ϕ. 
(4.7)
We see from (4.6)-(4.7) that sustained growth requires that the equilibrium interest 
rate along the turnpike exceeds impatience.   
Since a steady state cannot occur above the singular line (Claim 6), a potentially 
growing economy in this case (of non-intersecting characteristic lines) will realize its 
growth potential for any positive capital endowment.  Moreover (see Appendix B for 
a proof):  
Property 4.1: Under the specifications (4.1), (4.4) and the growth condition (4.6), the 
optimal private and social (h,k) processes reach the respective private and social 
turnpikes (4.2) at a most-rapid-learning rate (α = 0 or α = 1 while below or above the 































The turnpike growth rate is achieved by devoting to learning the constant income 
fraction  
(p)  p p
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Saving obtains the income fraction    17
(p)     p p p p p p r g a y k s / / / β ηα = = = &
(so)  s   so so so so so so r g y k / / β ηα = = = &
(4.10)
and the residual income fraction  
(p)  c p p p p p p r g b s y / ) 1 ( 1 1 / − − = − − = α  
(so)  c so so so so so so r g s y / 1 1 / − = − − = α  
(4.11)
is consumed.   
The growth conditions (4.6) ensure that gp and gso are positive while σ > 1 
implies that αp lies between 0 and a(1−β) and αso lies between 0 and 1−β.  The 
endogenous exponential growth of (4.8) is directly linked to the constant returns to 
human capital h in the knowledge production function (2.4), implied in equilibrium by 
(4.4) along the singular line (where k is proportional to h).  (Solow 2000 discusses 
equivalent assumptions in a variety of endogenous growth models.)  
From (4.8), we obtain  
0 ) 1 ( ) (
1 > − = − = −
−β ϕ σ a r r g g p so p so ,  (4.12)
hence (as expected) the private economy grows too slowly.  The reason can be traced 
to insufficient learning on the part of households, as can be seen from  
0 / ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 /( ) ( > − − − = − − so p so r a a ρ β α α σ
β ,  (4.13)
which follows from (4.9), (4.7) and the growth condition (4.6).  In fact, households 





























β .  (4.14)
This leaves a smaller income fraction for consumption under the socially optimal 
policy.  However, since this fraction is derived from yso which grows faster than its   18
private counterpart yp, the overall welfare obtained under the socially optimal plan is 
larger.  
Table 4.1 compares the turnpike values of various economic variables for the 
private and socially optimal scenarios.  The results in Table 4.1 are relevant when 
both the private and socially optimal plans give rise to growing economies, i.e., when 
both conditions (4.6) hold.  The difference induced by knowledge spillover is even 
more pronounced when a
1−βϕ < ρ < ϕ.  In this case, the steady-state line k  lies 
between the private and social singular lines, implying that the economy (eventually) 
stagnates under the private plan but growth exponentially under the social policy.   
) (h
Table 4.1:  Private and social outcomes. 
 Private  Social  Disparity   
Interest rate  rp = a
1−βϕ
  rso = ϕ  rso – rp = ϕ(1−a
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The rightmost column of Table 4.1 presents the growth effects of knowledge 
spillovers.  Whether these effects are indeed appreciable depends on the parameter 
values, in particular on a and b – the exponents representing the internal and external 
effects of knowledge.  To gain insight on the significance of knowledge spillover 
effects we evaluate relative turnpike values of the variables of Table 4.1 for 
representative parameters.  Following the literature (e.g., Mankiw et al. 1992) capital 
share is assumed at β = 1/3.  Regarding the private and social effects of knowledge we   19
take as a benchmark the assessment that they are of the same order of magnitude 
(Wolfe and Haveman 2002).  However, in order not to overstate the external effects, 
we allow for a larger private contribution by assuming a/b = 3.  It then follows from 
(4.4) that b = 2/9 and a = 2/3.  Moreover, we set θ = 0.099 so as to obtain the private 
interest rate of 0.04 (i.e., 4% return to capital along the private singular line).  The 
corresponding social interest rate (the return to capital along the social singular line) 
then equals 5.24 %.  Thus 
rp = 0.04  and  rso = 0.0524.   
With a utility discount rate of ρ = 0.03, we obtain gso/gp = 2.24, αso/αp = 2.56 
and sso/sp = 1.71: the turnpike growth rate under the social policy is more than twice 
its private counterpart and this faster growth is achieved by higher investment in 
human capital (the fraction of income allocated to human capital investment under the 
social policy is 2.56 times the corresponding fraction under the private policy).  The 
corresponding figures for a more forward-looking economy with ρ = 0.01 are 
gso/gp = 1.41, αso/αp = 1.62 and sso/sp = 1.08: the effects of knowledge spillover on 
growth rate and on human capital investment are significant for this economy as well.   
The value 0.099 assigned to the social infrastructure parameter θ has been 
chosen to give rp = 0.04.  It is of interest to find the minimal value of θ that supports 
growth.  When ρ = 3%, reducing θ below 0.0743 leads to a violation of the growth 
condition (4.6p) and transforms a growing private-learning-economy into a 
converging (stagnating) type.  Reducing θ further below 0.0567 violates (4.6so) and 
transforms the social economy into a converging type.  For values of θ between 
0.0743 and 0.0567, private learning entails stagnation while the social learning policy 
supports long run growth.     20
5.  Optimal learning regulation  
The failure of the competitive equilibrium to induce appropriate human capital 
investment calls for policy intervention.  In actual practice such an intervention takes 
different forms, including state-financed schooling and training, and subsidized higher 
education (see Wolfe and Haveman 2002 for data on public spending on education in 
a number of countries).  In this section we offer a mechanism that implements the 
socially optimal outcome for the economy specified in Section 4.  The mechanism 
consists of a learning subsidy to encourage human capital investments and linear taxes 
to cover the subsidy payments.  The taxes alter between a flat income tax during the 
transitional phase (while the knowledge-capital processes approach the turnpike) and 
a flat consumption (or value added) tax along the singular line.  The tax proceeds 
exactly match the subsidy outlays at each point of time, so no lump sum transfers are 
needed.  
Learning subsidy:  For every income unit spent on learning, the household 
receives a coupon worth q income units that can be used to pay for additional learning 
only.  This policy modifies the human capital accumulation process (2.4) to  
) , , ( ) 1 ( H h k y q h + =α & .  (5.1)
The value of q that provides the right learning incentives turns out to be (1−a)/a.  To 
avoid overinvestment in human capital, that is to ensure that α(1+q) does not exceed 
unity, the subsidy is given only while α ≤ a.  The subsidy policy can be succinctly 
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It is verified in Appendix B that this policy changes households' learning decisions 
(αt) in such a way that their private singular line changes from   to  .    ) (h k
S
p ) (h k
S
so
Taxes:  To balance the mechanism's budget, a flat income tax at a rate m or a flat 
consumption tax at a rate v is used.  These taxes modify the household's saving 
process (2.5) to  
c v y m k ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + − − − = α & .  (5.3)
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No subsidy or taxes are used below the singular line.   
Efficiency:  The tax proceeds exactly match the subsidy payments 
when 
qαy = my + vc.    (5.6)
A q-v-m policy that satisfies (5.6) at all times is called feasible.  The policy is efficient 
if it yields the socially optimal (h,k) process.  Indeed, we verify in Appendix C that: 
Property 5.1:  The mechanism defined by (5.1)-(5.5) is feasible and efficient.   
The centerpiece of this mechanism consists of the learning subsidy that modifies 
the household's singular line from the private   to the socially optimal  .  
The subsidy induces households to increase the income fraction they devote to 
) (h k
S
p ) (h k
S
so  22
learning from αp to the regulated fraction αr = aαso, which is still below the socially 
optimal fraction αso.  According to (5.1) and (5.2), however, the subsidy ensures that 
the fraction αr implies the correct socially optimal investment in human capital.   
Along the turnpike, the consumption tax has no effect on household decisions 
(Rebelo 1991 showed that this property holds also for an extended Lucas model).  
Thus, this tax can serve to finance the learning subsidy.  Applied at the rate 
v=bgso/(rso−gso), this tax will raise the exact amount needed to cover the subsidy 
expense.  This goal cannot be achieved with the income tax, since its distorting effects 
divert households away from the social turnpike  .  Above the turnpike, 
however, income tax is used temporarily to guide the process towards k .  At this 
stage, the income tax serves a dual role: first its distorting effects modify the saving-
consumption balance and lead the (h,k) process towards the turnpike at the socially 
optimal pace.  Second, its proceeds match exactly the subsidy payments, so that the 







Below   (at (h,k) states satisfying  ), the socially optimal policy 
is to avoid learning and build up capital until the singular line is reached.  The 
regulator, then, has no reason to support learning and the subsidy is set to zero.  As a 
result, the taxes can also be avoided during this phase.   
) (h k
S
so ) (h k k
S
so <
6.  Concluding comments 
  There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that external effects of human capital 
– social benefits not privately captured – are substantial.  This paper investigates 
growth consequences of these effects and finds them to be significant under a wide 
range of circumstances.  In the extreme case, an economy that sustains long run 
growth under the social policy would stagnate under the private policy.  We offer a   23
simple mechanism, based on a flat learning subsidy and altering income-consumption 
taxes, that implements the socially optimal policy.  The mechanism is self-financed in 
that the linear income and consumption taxes, each levied during a different phase of 
the growth process, match the subsidy payments at each point of time. 
Growth failures in our model can happen for two reasons: either the economy 
fails to satisfy the growth condition, or it lacks resources to realize its growth 
potential.  The former situation is often due to poor social infrastructure, such as 
corruption, excessive bureaucracy, or insufficient enforcement of property rights.  
External infusion of capital – a common means of foreign aid for stagnating 
economies – can jumpstart economic growth for economies that satisfy the growth 
condition but not for those that fail in this respect (Burnside and Dollar 2000, Easterly 
2003).  For the latter economies, structural changes must take place in order to escape 
poverty.  A policy that provides the right learning incentives may turn a stagnating 
economy into a growing one and in general accelerates growth.   
Appendix A: Derivation of the optimal plan 
We derive here the optimal private plan.  The derivation of the socially optimal 
plan follows the same line and is therefore omitted.  The decision problem entails 
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subject to (2.5), (2.6), kt ≥ 0, ct ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1, given the endowments k0 and h0.  
The current-value Hamiltonian is 
Ht = u(ct) + λt[(1−αt)y(kt,ht,Ht) − ct] + γtαty(kt,ht,Ht),  (A.2)
where λ and γ represent the current-value costate variables of k and h, respectively.  
Necessary conditions for optimum include    24

























(  is the singular solution defined below),  
S
t α
] ) 1 )[( , , ( t t t t t t t k t t H h k y γ α λ α ρλ λ + − − = − & ,  (A.5)
] ) 1 )[( , , ( t t t t t t t h t t H h k y γ α λ α ργ γ + − − = − &   (A.6)
and the transversality conditions  
(a)  limt→∞{ktλte
−ρt} = 0    and    (b)  limt→∞{htγte
−ρt} =  0.  (A.7)
Condition (A.4) identifies three possible learning regimes: no learning (α = 0), 
maximal learning efforts (α = 1) and singular learning (α = α
S).  The optimal plan 
consists of selecting among these three regimes at different phases of the planning 
horizon.  Given the learning regime, only k remains an independent state variable.  
The selection among the three learning regimes, thus, reduces the two-state problem 
(A.1) into a series of single-state problems.   
The steady-state line k(h) is defined by the solution to f '(k/A(h))B(Lh) = ρ (cf. 
(3.3)).  This equation is implied by the two conditions   (i.e., α=0) and   
that must hold at any optimal steady-state (see (2.4) and (A.5)).  Thus, if the optimal 
solution ever approaches a steady state, it must fall on this line.  Since we refer to this 
property below, we state it as:   
0 = h & 0 = λ &
Claim 1:  An optimal steady state (h
*,k




Below the steady-state line (where k < k(h)), the strict concavity of f implies yk>ρ .  
Thus, using (A.4) and (A.5),   below this line.  This, together with (A.3) and  0 < λ &  25
u″(c) < 0, implies that c  also holds below the steady-state line.  The reverse 
relations hold above the line if α < 1, yielding 
0 > &
αγ Λ( ] k
Claim 2:  The optimal consumption process increases in time below the steady-state 
line under all learning regimes and decreases in time above the steady-state line when 
αt < 1.  ■ 
Implementing the singular plan α = α
S during a time interval is optimal only if the 
condition λt = γt (see (A.4)) holds during this interval, implying also  .  Using 
(A.5) and (A.6) we find that these conditions imply yk = yh, which defines the singular 
line (3.2).  We obtain the following characterization:  
t t γ λ & & =
Claim 3:  Singular learning can proceed only along the singular line.  ■  
Let Λ(k,h) = yk(k,h,Lh) − yh(k,h,Lh), so that along the singular line Λ(k
S(h),h) must 
vanish.  Moreover, f " < 0 implies ykk(k,h,Lh) < 0 and yhk(k,h,Lh) > 0, hence   
Claim 4:  Λ(k,h) > 0 below the singular line and Λ(k,h) < 0 above it.  ■ 
  According to (A.4), the optimal learning rate is determined by ζ = γ −λ:  α = 1 
is optimal when ζ > 0; α = 0 is optimal when ζ < 0 and α = α
S is adopted when 
ζ =   = 0.  Using (A.5) and (A.6), one finds  ζ&
ρζ λ α ζ + + − = ) , ) 1 [( h & .  (A.8)
Since the shadow prices are positive, we conclude:    
Claim 5:  (a)  If maximal learning (ζ > 0) is optimal below the singular line, then 
ζ e
−ρt→∞.  (b)  If no learning (ζ < 0) is optimal above the singular line, then 
ζ e
−ρt→ −∞.   ■   26
Observe that allowing the faster-than-exponential divergence of ζ  in Claim 5 to 
proceed permanently is inconsistent with the transversality conditions (A.7).  Since a 
steady state involves no learning, Claim 5b implies  
Claim 6:  A steady state cannot fall above the singular line. ■   
Claim 5 entails restrictions also on the dynamic processes.  For example, under 
maximal learning, physical capital must decrease.  If the maximal learning regime is 
adopted at or below the singular line, the sub-optimal behavior of Claim 5a will be 
followed permanently.  Hence, 
Claim 7:  Maximal learning can be optimal only above the singular line. ■   
In fact, maximal learning can hold only during a finite period, after which it must be 
replaced by either no learning (above the singular line) or singular learning (along the 
singular line). 
When no learning takes place, the capital process is monotonic in time because 
knowledge remains constant and the problem is essentially one-dimensional.  Above 
the singular line, this regime must involve decreasing capital until the singular line is 
reached, for otherwise the sub-optimal behavior of Claim 5b will be followed 
permanently.  Now, ζ must be negative when the singular line is reached from above 
under the no-learning regime (α=0).  Since no other plan can hold below the singular 
line (Claims 3 and 7), this capital decreasing, constant-knowledge plan must converge 
to a steady state on the steady-state line segment below the singular line. 
Initiated below the singular line, a no-learning (α = 0) process cannot cross it.  
Neither can it switch to another regime below the singular line (the singular plan 
holds only on the singular line and Claim 7 precludes maximal learning below the 
singular line).  The only two possibilities left are to converge to a steady state below   27
the singular line or to reach the singular line (with ζ = 0) and switch to singular 
learning.  We summarize these considerations in  
Claim 8:   (a) When initiated above the singular line, a no-learning regime continues 
permanently and the ensuing (h,k) process converges to a steady state on the steady-
state line segment below the singular line.  (b) When initiated below the singular line, 
a no-learning regime process either converges to a steady state below the singular line 
or reaches the singular line and switches to the singular learning regime. ■   
Once the singular learning regime has been initiated on the singular line (with 
) we find, using (A.8), that the (h,k) process cannot leave the singular line 
without violating Claim 7 or 8 (in other words, the singular regime is trapping).  In 
view of Claim 1, the following characterization holds: 
0 = =ζ ζ&
Claim 9:  The singular regime process either converges to a steady state on the 
intersection point   of the steady-state and singular lines or grows indefinitely 
along the singular line. ■   
) ˆ , ˆ ( k h
To decide between the two options of Claim 9, consider a singular regime process 
that grows permanently along a singular line segment above the steady-state line.  
According to Claim 2, this involves a decreasing consumption process.  However, the 
policy of staying at the initial state (diverting to consumption the resources allocated 
by the singular plan to increase the capital and knowledge stocks), is feasible and 
yields a higher utility.  Therefore, a singular learning regime that drives the (h,k) 
process permanently along the singular line above the steady-state line cannot be 
optimal.  Of course, a singular plan that drives the (h,k) process along a segment 
above the steady-state line during a finite period, and upon reaching the intersection   28
point moves on to a singular segment below the steady-state line cannot be ruled out.  
These considerations imply 
Claim 10:  A singular plan cannot be confined to a segment of the singular line that 
lies above the steady-state line.  ■   
We apply these results to characterize the optimal processes corresponding to the 
economy types introduced in Section 3.   
Converging Economies:  When the characteristic lines cross, a converging 
economy is characterized by the property that the steady-state line crosses the singular 
line from above (Figure 1).  It follows from Claims 1 and 6 that an optimal steady 
state must lie on the steady-state line segment with h   Suppose 0 < k0 < k
S(h0).  
Claim 7 forbids maximal learning, and singular learning can be take place only along 
the singular line, thus α = 0 is initially optimal.  Since k(h0) > k
S(h0), Claim 8b 
implies that it is optimal to delay learning and increase capital until kt reaches k
S(h0), 
and proceeds thereafter along the singular line towards the intersection point.  
According to Claim 10, it cannot be optimal to continue the singular policy past the 
intersection point (where the singular line lies above the steady-state line).   The only 
steady state allowed on the singular line by Claim 1 is the intersection point.  Thus, 
we deduce from Claim 9 that the optimal (h,k) process must converge to a steady state 
at the intersection point (  
. ˆ h ≥
). ˆ , ˆ k h
With capital endowment larger than k
S(h0), delaying learning is no longer 
advantageous (Claim 8a) and the optimal policy is to initially set α = 1, increasing 
knowledge and decreasing capital until the (h,k) process reaches the singular line at 
some time.  From that time on, α is reduced to the singular value, and the process 
continues along the singular line to the steady state      ). ˆ , ˆ ( k h  29
Evidently, the higher the initial endowment k0, the higher is the point at which the 
singular line is reached.  In fact, there exists some threshold initial stock 
k
1(h0) > k
S(h0) such that the (h,k) process initiated from (h0,k
1(h0)) with α = 1 meets 
the singular line exactly at   (see Figure 1).  To see this, we solve the dynamic 
equations for (k,h,λ) backwards in time with α = 1, using the reversed time τ = −t and 
the initial values   and 
) ˆ , ˆ ( k h
h h 0 = = τ k k ˆ , ˆ
0 = = τ ) ˆ ( 0 c u′ = = τ λ  where c ˆ  is the 
equilibrium consumption rate holding at ( .  The threshold stock k
1(h0) is 
determined from the solution as the state kτ corresponding to the reversed time τ  
when hτ = h0.  Using Claim 4 and the time-reversed version of (A.8) initiated with 
ζτ=0 = 0, it is verified that   along the solution and 
maximal learning is indeed optimal all the way back to (h0,k
1(h0)).   
) h ˆ L , h ˆ , k ˆ ( y =
0
) ˆ , ˆ k h
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When k0 > k
1(h0), the maximal learning plan brings the process to a point   
above the singular line.  In such cases, this plan continues to higher knowledge stocks, 
but it cannot cross the singular line (Claim 7) or meet it above the steady-state line 
(Claim 10).  At some point above the singular line the variable ζ vanishes and 
learning ceases abruptly, leading to a k-decreasing process towards a steady state on 
the steady-state line segment below the singular line.  Thus, (  is the optimal 
steady state whenever k0 ≤ k
1(h0), while larger endowments imply higher asymptotic 
knowledge and capital stocks.  
) , ˆ ( k h
) ˆ , ˆ k h
When the steady-state line lies below the singular line for all h > h0, no point 
along it can be ruled out as a steady state.  Of course, optimal trajectories that end by 
a singular approach to the intersection point are not feasible in this case, but otherwise 
the characterization above is not affected.   30
Potentially growing Economies:  Here the steady-state line crosses the singular 
line from below (Figures 4-5).  Claims 1 and 6 restrict optimal steady states to lie on 
the steady-state line segment between h0 and    In contrast to the previous, 
converging case, Claim 10 forbids the optimal process to converge to the intersection 
point   along the singular line.  However, unbounded growth along the singular 
line cannot be ruled out.  The dynamic behavior, then, depends on two critical capital 
stocks defined by the following properties: k
2(h0) is the maximum endowment for 
which it is optimal to avoid learning altogether and approach the steady state 
(h0,k(h0)).  (If the endowment k0 = k(h0) implies approaching the singular line, set 
k
2(h0) = 0.)  Obviously, for all 0 < k0 < k
2(h0) it is optimal to avoid learning and 
converge to (h0,k(h0)).  k
3(h0) is the minimum endowment in excess of k
S(h0) for 
which eventual growth along the singular line is optimal.   
. ˆ h
) ˆ , ˆ ( k h
If the endowment k0 = k
S(h0) implies unbounded singular growth, set k
3(h0) = 
k
S(h0).  Otherwise, to find k
3(h0) note, using Claims 1 and 6, that there must exist a 
minimal knowledge level  h ˆ hm ≤ < 0 h  such that initiated from the state (hm,k
S(hm)) on 
the singular line, the optimal process follows the singular plan of unbounded growth.  
The critical level k
3(h0) is obtained by solving the dynamic equations for h, k and λ 
backwards in time with α = 1, using the initial values (hm,k
S(hm)) and the initial value 
of λ determined by the condition that the constant knowledge plan that drives the 
system from (hm,k
S(hm)) to a steady state at (hm,k(hm)) is also optimal.  The critical 
level k
3(h0) corresponds to the (reversed) time when the state h = h0 is reached.  
Evidently, k
3(h0) ≥ k
2(h0), and for all k0 > k
3(h0) it is optimal to initially learn at the 
maximal rate and drive the process to the singular line and then switch to unbounded 
growth under the singular plan.     31
To characterize the behavior for intermediate endowments with k
2(h0)<k0<k
3(h0) 
we distinguish between two cases: (i) k
2(h0)≥k
S(h0) (Figure 4) and (ii) k
2(h0)<k
S(h0) 
(Figure 5).  In case (i) a maximal learning rate is initially adopted.  Learning is then 
ceased upon the vanishing of ζ at some point above the singular line, and the process 
crosses the singular line towards a steady state on the steady-state line below  (see the 
intermediate trajectory of Figure 4). Case (ii) implies k
3(h0) = k
S(h0) because any point 
on the singular line gives rise to a growing singular plan.  Delayed learning leads the 
process to (h0,k
S(h0)).  Once the singular line is reached, the singular plan of 
unbounded growth takes over (see the intermediate trajectory of Figure 5). 
If the characteristic lines never cross, Claims 1 and 6 forbid the existence of any 
steady state, hence the economy must grow permanently along the singular line.  
When k0 < k
S(h0) the no learning regime (α = 0) is invoked, increasing capital until 
k
S(h0) is reached (Claim 8b), at which time the singular learning regime is adopted to 
steer the (h,k) process along the singular line.  In contrast, when k0 > k
S(h0) the no-
learning regime is suboptimal (Claim 8a) and maximal learning (α = 1) is employed 
until the singular line is reached and the singular plan takes over.  This behavior is 
described as a most-rapid-learning-approach to the turnpike. 
Appendix B:  Turnpike growth processes (Properties 4.1 & 5.1) 
In Appendix A we establish the basic policy rule for growing economies:  reach 
the singular line at a most-rapid-learning rate and proceed along it thereafter.  This 
policy rule applies to both the private and social plans, which differ only in the 
location of the corresponding singular line.  The private plan under the q-m-v 
mechanism is called the regulated plan.  This plan abides by the same policy rule, 
with its own singular line that depends on the regulation parameters q, m and v.  Here 
we derive the optimal growth processes along the singular lines of the private (p),   32
social (so) and regulated (r) plans assuming the production technology and utility 
specified in (4.1) and the growth condition (4.6).  As it turns out, the optimal q-m-v 
values of the regulated plan differ between the transitional phase (i.e., during the 
most-rapid-learning-approach to the singular line) and the equilibrium (singular) 
phase.  In this appendix we analyze the equilibrium phase; the transitional phase is 
considered in Appendix C.   
The derivation is similar for the three plans and we use a generic formulation 
incorporating all of them as special cases.  Thus, we extend (2.4) and (2.5) to account 
for the regulation mechanism,  
(a)      } , , { , ) 1 ( r so p j y q h j ∈ + =α &
(b)     } , , { , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( r so p j c v y m k j j ∈ + − − − = α &
(B.1)

















































and the optimal values of q, m and v are derived below.  Unless otherwise indicated, 
the use of the subscript j implies j ∈ {p,so,r}.   





hence yk = βy/k for all plans, yh = a(1−β)y/h  for the private and regulated plans, in 
which H is taken as a given parameter, and yh = [a(1−β)+b]y/h = (1−β)y/h for the 
social plan (that accounts explicitly for the relation H/L = h), where the rightmost 
equality follows from (4.4).   33
Following Appendix A, we find that the condition for singular learning 
generalizes to yk = (1+qj)yh, yielding linear singular lines  





with the slopes 
} , { )], 1 ( /[ r p j q a j j ∈ + =η χ  and  ) 1 /( so so q + =η χ   (B.5)
Recalling that qso = 0, we see that the subsidy rate leading to χr = χso = η  is   
qr = q = (1− a)/a   (B.6)
as specified in (5.2).  Under (B.6), the social and regulated singular lines coincide. 









and the marginal knowledge productivity is ∂  for j ∈ {p,r} 
and ∂  (only the social planner accounts for the external effects).  
Thus, we rewrite (B.7) as 
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, =   (B.8)
where the coefficient   
} , { ), 1 /( 1 r p j b Z j ∈ − = ;       Zso = 1  (B.9)
accounts for the neglect of the external effects in the evaluation of the marginal 
productivity of knowledge along the private and regulated singular lines.   
It is expedient to express the marginal knowledge productivity as 
) 1 /(
S
, j j j h j q W r y + =
 
(B.10)
where rj is the interest rate along the corresponding singular lines (see 4.7):    34
}, , { , r so j rj ∈ =ϕ  and    ϕ
β − =
1 a rp (B.11)
and using (4.4), (B.5)-(B.9) (and some straightforward algebraic manipulations) 
) 1 ( 1 j j j q W + + = χ .  (B.12)
In the following discussion we suppress, for brevity, the index j from the 
dynamic variables (α, c, y etc.) but continue to use it to distinguish among the 
constant parameters of the three problems.  Inserting (B.4) into (B.1) gives 
, which can be reduced, using (B.12), to 
obtain the consumption fraction 
c v y m y q j j j j ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
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subject to (B.1a), ht ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ αt ≤ (1−mj)/Wj, where h0 is reset to the knowledge 
state at which the singular plan begins.  (Similarly, we reset the time at which the 
singular process starts to t = 0.)   





j j y q y
v
W m









The necessary conditions include  
j j j W v q c u / ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( + + = ′ γ   (B.16)
and, using (B.10) and (B.16), 
j j j m r h H Φ − ≡ − − = ∂ ∂ − = γ ρ γ ργ γ )] 1 ( [ / & ,  (B.17)
where    35
ρ − − = Φ ) 1 ( j j j m r .  (B.18)
From (B.17), γ = γ0 exp(−Φjt) and (B.16) implies c ] ) ( " /[ ) ( ' / c c u c u c j − Φ = &  which for 
the isoelastic utility u(c)=(c
1−σ−1)/(1−σ) reduces to 
. / / σ j j g c c Φ = ≡ &   (B.19)
According to (B.11) rr = rso = ϕ.  Since mso = 0, we see from (B.18) and (B.19) 
that any positive value of the income tax mr distorts the regulated growth process 
relative to its desired (socially optimal) rate.  Thus, to obtain the same growth rates 
for the regulated and social plans the regulator must set 
mr = m = 0  (B.20)
along the singular line.  We suppress, therefore, all reference to the income tax for the 
rest of Appendix B.  We also note that the turnpike growth rate is independent of the 
consumption tax vj, suggesting this tax as the appropriate tool to fund the learning 
subsidy along the singular line.   
Condition (4.6) and σ > 1 ensure that consumption grows exponentially at the rate 
0 < gj < rj.  It turns out that income, capital and knowledge are all proportional to 
consumption along the singular line and thus grow at the same rate.  This is so 
because the optimal learning fraction αt is constant along the singular line.  To verify 
this, compare (B.1) with (B.8) and (B.10) to find h .  Using (B.8), (B.10) 
and (B.13) we write the consumption rate as c = h(1−αWj)ZjrjWj/[(1+vj)(1+qj)].  Thus, 
, yielding 
h W r Z j j j α = &
) 1 /( j j W α − ) 1 /( / / j j j j j j W W r Z W W h h c c g α α α α − = − − = = & & & &
), 1 )( 1 ( − Ω − = α α α j j j j j W W g W &   (B.21)
where Ωj  = Zjrj/gj  > 1.     36






















α   To set the integration constant ψj, note that with 
Ωj > 1 any non vanishing value of ψj that avoids divergence at finite time implies that 
Wjα converges to unity in the long run with 1 ] )t 1 ( [ g exp W j j j − Ω − ≈ − α  (the notation 
at ≈ bt signifies that the ratio at/bt approaches a constant as t→∞).  It follows that 
] [ ] [ )] 1 ( t r Z exp t g exp W W r j j j j j j j /[ ) 1 )( 1 ( Z q v c h j j j = Ω ≈ − + + = α , hence 
] ) 1 ( [ ] ) t Z r exp t j j j [( ) ( r Z exp t exp h j j − = − Φ − ≈ − ρ ρ γ  (cf. (B.18)).  Since Zj ≥ 1 (see 
B.9), the exponent on the right-hand side does not approach zero at large t, violating 
the transversality condition (A.7b).  Thus, the optimal integration constant ψj must 
vanish for all plans, reducing the optimal α to the constant αj = 1/(ΩjWj), which 
ensures that 1 − Wjαj = (rjZj − gj)/rjZj > 0.   
Using the explicit expressions above for each problem, and recalling that the 
growth and interest rates are equal along the social and regulated singular lines, we 
find 
so so so p p p r g r ag / ) 1 ( , / ) 1 ( β α β α − = − =  and  so so r r ag / ) 1 ( β α − =   (B.22)
verifying (4.9).  Note that αr = aαso < αso.  Nevertheless, the subsidy policy implies 
that regulated learning is enhanced by the factor 1+qr = 1/a, hence proceeds at the 
socially optimal rate. 
It remains to determine the consumption tax rate vr = v along the singular line.  
This turns out to be a simple task because v affects neither the growth rate nor the 
learning fraction along the singular line and can be adjusted to cover the subsidy 
payments.  Noting (B.13), we see that qrαry
S = vrc = vr(1−αrWr)y
S/(1+vr), hence   37
) 1 /( r r r r r r r q W q v α α α − − = .  From (4.4), (B.6), (B.9) and (B.22) we find that 
αrWr = (1−b)gso/rso and αrqr = bgso/rso, yielding  
) /( so so so r g r bg v v − = = ,  (B.23)
as specified in (5.4).  With v given by (B.23), the consumption/income ratio for the 
regulated economy is  , which is the same as the socially 
optimal ratio (see B13).  It follows that the regulated and socially optimal 
consumption (and the utilities derived thereof) coincide at all times. 
so so r r r
S
r r r g v q y c / 1 / / − = =α
Appendix C:  The transitional phase of the regulated plan (Property 5.1 cont.) 
In Appendix B we analyze the equilibrium growth phase (along the singular 
line), setting the subsidy rate q so that the social and regulated singular lines coincide 
and imposing the consumption tax rate v such that the tax proceeds just cover the 
subsidy payments at each point of time.  Here we consider the transitional phase 
(away from the singular line) and show that the regulated plan coincides with the 
socially optimal policy of a most rapid learning approach to the singular line.  The 
reasoning follows closely the arguments of Appendix A. 
Under (B.6) the r and so singular lines are the same   and lie 
below their p counterpart  , while the growth condition (4.6) ensures 
that the (common) steady-state line lies above all of them.  For k < ηh, the socially 
optimal policy is to avoid leaning and accumulate capital until the singular line is 
reached (Appendix A).  The regulator, then, has no reason to support leaning, hence 
neither subsidy nor taxes are used below the social-regulated singular line.  Without 
subsidy or taxes, the conditions of the p problem, which admits no learning below its 
own singular line, apply.  Thus, the optimal r policy is to set αt = 0 and increase 
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capital until k  is reached (any other choice entails the contradictions that 




k t y ρλ − =
t y − =
λ − 1 ( m
Consider the optimal learning policy for k > ηh.  Equations (A.5) and (A.6) for the 
regulated process are modified to 
] ) 1 ( ) 1 [( t t t t t q m γ α λ α λ + + − − − &   (C.1)
and  
] ) 1 ( ) 1 [( t t t t h t q m γ α λ α ργ γ + + − − − & .  (C.2)
To rule out the no learning policy above the singular line, note that the choice αt = 0 is 
optimal only when the variable ζ = (1+q)γ −λ takes negative values.  However, when 
αt = 0 we find from (C.1) and (C.2)  
ρζ ζ + − + − = ] ) 1 )[( k h y y q & .  (C.3)
Recalling that yk = βy/k and yh = a(1−β)y/k for the r problem (see B.3), the term inside 
the square brackets of (C.3) must be positive when k > ηh.  Thus, for any income tax 
rate below unity (m<1), a negative value of ζ entails the divergence of ζe
−ρt (as in 
Claim 5b), violating the transversality conditions (A.7).  It follows that maximal 
learning αt = 1/(1+q) = a is optimal above  .  Together with the result that αt = 0 
below the singular line, we find that, away from the singular line, the optimal 





To cover the subsidy cost above the singular line, the tax proceeds must satisfy 
(5.6) or vc+ my = αqy = (1−a)y.  However, away from the singular line the optimal 
consumption/income ratio is not necessarily constant hence the only way to balance 
the budget with constant tax rates is to set v = 0 and m = 1−a, in accordance with (5.4) 
and (5.5).   39
The most-rapid-learning-approach to   implies that once the singular 
line is reached, the optimal r process must remain on it, following the so growth 
pattern established in Appendix B and yielding the so value.  For r processes initiated 
above the singular line, the subsidy and tax rates determined above reduce (B.1) to 
 and   which agree with the so equations of motion under the maximal 
learning policy of αso = 1.  Given the learning policy, external effects do not enter the 
consumption-saving tradeoffs, hence the r and so processes must coincide all the way 
to the singular line.  Similar considerations apply to processes initiated below the 
singular line, which avoid learning and increase capital at the socially optimal rate.   
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Figure 1:  Knowledge-capital processes for a converging economy.  Arrows indicate 
direction of evolution.  Economies with capital endowments at or below k
1(h0) 
approach the singular line and proceed along it to a steady state at the intersection 
point  .    ) ˆ , ˆ ( k h






































Figure 2:  Time profiles of learning fraction (top), knowledge (center) and capital 
(bottom) processes for a converging economy when k0 < k
S(h0).  The h and k 
processes reach the singular line at time τ .   
 
 



















Figure 3:  Time profiles of learning fraction (top), knowledge (center) and capital 
(bottom) processes for a converging economy when k
1(h0) > k0 > k
S(h0).  The h and k 


































Figure 4:  Knowledge-capital processes for a potentially growing economy when 
k
2(h0) > k
S(h0).  Arrows indicate the direction of process evolution.  When capital 
endowment is below k
2(h0), no learning takes place.  When capital endowment is 
between k
2(h0) and k
3(h0), maximal learning (α=1) takes place initially, then learning 
ceases and the economy converge to a steady state on the steady-state line.  When 
k0 > k
3(h0), the economy approaches the singular line at a most-rapid-learning rate and 








































Figure 5:  Knowledge-capital processes for a potentially growing economy when 
k
2(h0) < k
S(h0).  Arrows indicate the direction of evolution.  When capital endowment 
is below k
2(h0) no learning takes place and the economy converges to k(h0).  When 
k0 > k
2(h0), the economy approaches the singular line at a most-rapid-learning rate and 
grows along it thereafter. 
h0 
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